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I. INTRODUCTION
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome is an epidemic that has gripped the
nation in increasing proportions. Society at large is fearful of this deadly
disease. Despite the emphasis on the need for further education concerning the
transmission of AIDS,2 misconceptions persist.3 Many believe that those who
have contact with the public in certain settings should mandatorily be tested
4
for AIDS and the virus that causes AIDS, Human Immunodeficiency Virus.
5
Some cities have mandatory AIDS testing for certain government employees.
City officials hope that testing will restore faith in community services by

1

Hereinafter AIDS.
See Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402, 405 (N.D. Ohio
1991); Scott Burris, Education to Reduce the Spread of AIDS, in AIDS LAw TODAY 82, 82
(Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993).
3
See infra IV.B. AIDS in the Courtroom and accompanying notes.
2

4

Hereinafter HIV. Previous synonyms for HIV are HTLV-II, type 3, and
lymphadenopathy associated virus. Helena Brett-Smith, M.D. & Gerald H. Friedland,
M.D., Transmissionand Treatment, in AIDS LAw TODAY, supranote 2, at 18,21.
5

See, e.g., Anonymous Fireman,779 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
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providing physically healthy emergency personnel. Mandatory testing raises
a question whether these cities can have such testing and manipulate
employees' positions without violating federal legislation designed to reduce
discrimination against persons with disabilities. Another question raised is
whether the government can be held civilly or criminally liable for the acts of
an employee who is infected with HIV or AIDS.
This paper is divided into five sections. Part one deals with background
information on AIDS. Part two discusses current federal legislation. Part three
examines how AIDS falls under federal legislation and case law, including the
resulting impact of hiring AIDS-infected individuals. Part four evaluates
possible violations of the Fourth Amendment resulting from the federal
legislation and from an employer's mandatory testing of employees for the
HIV virus. The last section discusses the government's liability when a public
employee transmits AIDS to another individual during the course of
employment.
II. BACKGROUND ON AIDS

AIDS has been in the public eye for over a decade. 6 At first, AIDS was
categorized as a disease of homosexuals and drug users.7 As a result, society
at large was unconcerned about the disease spreading to the majority of the
population. Moreover, society's general disapproval of homosexuality led to
discrimination against those who contracted AIDS.
The AIDS disease is the result of HIV attacking human cells and then
integrating into the host cell. 8 The time between initial infection and
development of antibodies to HIV is called the "window period."9 Individuals
can be infected for months or even years before HIV makes its presence
physically known. 10 The only sign of infection during the window period is a
positive test for the HIV antibodies.11 The presence of the antibody does not

6

Abe M. Macher, HIV Disease/AIDS: Medical Background, in AIDS AND THE LAW 1
(Wiley Law Publications Editorial Staff eds., 2d ed. 1992).
7

During the early 1980's, there were reports that "apparently previously healthy
male homosexuals," intravenous drug abusers, and recipients of blood transfusions had
"profound defects in their immune systems." Id. at 1-2.
8

Harold Jaffe, The Application of MedicalFacts to the Courts, in AIDS AND THE COURTS

7, 8 (Clark C. Abt &Kathleen M. Hardy eds., 1990).
9
1d.
10

1d.

111d. Currently, there are two main tests used for determining whether or not an
individual is HIV-positive. One is the ELISA (enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay),

which tests for general antibodies to the HIV virus. The second is the Western blot, which
detects specific HIV antibodies and is thus moreaccurate. Both tests detect the antibody
produced by the immune system once the person has been exposed to HIV.Macher,
supra note 6, at 4.
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stop the progression of HIV.12 Normally, the immune system "fights off
infections by agents such as bacteria, viruses, fungi, protozoa, and other
parasites." 13 However, since the immune system does not function effectively
when an individual is infected with HIV, that individual is susceptible to
numerous diseases not normally seen in individuals with healthy immune
systems. 14

Over the past decade, HIV has spread at uncontrollable rates while infecting
new groups of people, such as young heterosexual females. 15 By 1991, between
1.5 and 2 million Americans were infected with the virus. 16 By the year 2000,
17
an estimated 40 million people worldwide will be infected with HIV.
Moreover, 222,740 cases of AIDS were reported to the World Health
Organization by February 1990, although the actual number of cases was
18
probably closer to 600,000 due to underreporting.
HIV and AIDS are spread only through very intimate contact. Currently,
transmission can occur in three known ways:19 "(1) through intimate sexual
contact with an infected person; (2) through invasive exposure to contaminated
blood or certain other bodily fluids; [and] (3) through prenatal exposure (i.e.,
from mother to infant)."20 In order for infection to occur, the bodily fluids 2l of
the infected individual must come into contact with the blood or mucous
membranes 22 of the uninfected individual. 23 Once infected with HIV, a
person's immune system is weakened, thereby leaving the victim susceptible

12Jaffe, supra note 8, at 9.
13 Macher, supra note 6, at 2.
14
Some of the diseases that AIDS-infected individuals are unable to resist include
pneumonia, candidiasis, toxoplasmosis, meningitis, and Kaposi's sarcoma. 1 J. E.
ScHMIDT, M.D., SCHMIDT's ATTORNEYs' DIcTIONARY OF MEDIcINE A-138 (1995).
1SPat Litchy, Note, Mandatory HIV Testing of Health Care Professionals, 13 HAMVLNE
J.PuB. L. & POL'Y 347,351 (1992) (citing National Commission on AIDS report).
16779 F. Supp. at 411.
17

Macher, supra note 6, at 17 (based on World Health Organization prediction).
NIDA Workgroup Report, AIDSiHIV Infection and the Workplace 1 (1990). In New
York City, AIDS is the third leading cause of death. Id. at 1. In the United States, for
males between the ages of 25 and45, it is the second leading cause of death. Laura Pincus,
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Employers' New Responsibility to HIV-Positive
Employees, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561, 565 (1993) (based upon CDC statistics).
18

19

Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 1988).

20 Id.
21Only blood, semen, or vaginal secretion are considered bodily fluids. Brett-Smith
& Friedland, supra note 4, at 23.
22
23

The mucous membranes include the mouth, eyes, urethra, vagina, or anus. Id.

Direct contact between intact skin and infected body fluids does not transmit the
virus and is therefore "nota risky exposure." Id. at 24.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 10:153

to "so called 'opportunistic infections,"' 24 which are often contagious and
usually deadly diseases. 25 Most of these opportunistic infections, however, are
not transmissible to persons with healthy immune systems.26
Even with this knowledge, society continues to discriminate against those
who have HIV and AIDS. Often those who contract the virus are unable to
obtain or continue employment, not because of the inability to work, but rather,
because of discrimination. 27 As a result of this discrimination, individuals
infected with either IRV or AIDS are considered disabled 28 and are protected
from discrimination in the workplace by the Rehabilitation Act of 197329 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act.30
III. APPLICABLE

FEDERAL LECISLATION

In order to deal with the continued discrimination against those with
disabilities, 31 President George Bush signed into law the ADA, comprehensive
legislation aimed at incorporating forty-three million disabled Americans 32
into the workforce. 33 The general principle of the Act forbids an employer from
discriminating against an individual with a disability when that person is
capable of performing the essential functions of the job, 34 either with or without
reasonable accommodations for his impairment.35 Disabled individuals are
thereby able to become uniformly more independent and self-sufficient while
24

Opportunistic infection is defined as "Ja]n infection that occurs because the
patient's resistance is compromised by medical or surgical treatment, malnutrition,
climatic stress, etc." 3 SCHMIDT'S ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, supra note 14, at
0-68.
25840 F.2d at 706.
26

1d. at 706 n.8.

27

Matthew E. Turowski, Note, AIDS in the Workplace: Perceptions,Prejudicesand Policy
Solutions, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 139, 140 (1993).
28
See Chalk,840 F.2d 701.
29

Hereinafter Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Chalk, 840 F.2d 701.

30

Hereinafter ADA.
31Congress found that prior to the Americans with Disabilities Act, "individuals who
have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal
recourse to redress such discrimination." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1992).

3242 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1). This is about 17% of thenation. OGLETREE ETAL, AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIEs ACT: EMPLOYEE RIGHTS & EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS xv (1995).
33

Thomas H. Christopher & Charles M. Rice, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: An
Overview of the Employment Provisions,33 S. TEX. L. REV. 759, 760 (1992).
34

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 required the applicant to be able to perform all or

most of the functions of a job before being a "qualified" handicapped person. G. William
Davenport, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Appraisal of the Major
Employment-Related Compliance and Litigation Issues, 43 ALA. L. REV. 307,318 (1992).
35Christopher & Rice, supra note 33, at 763.
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fully participating in society.36 The purpose of the Act is "to provide a clear and
comprehensive mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
37
individuals with disabilities."
Prior to the ADA, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act. 38 The
Rehabilitation Act covered the "federal government, federal government
39
contractors and subcontractors, and recipients of federal financial assistance,
yet excluded uniformed military personnel and Library of Congress
employees. 40 This legislation left loopholes for employers in the private sector
as well as some state and local governments. 41 As a result of the loopholes and
exclusions, many disabled individuals were still left without much assistance
in getting work with those employers. Due to this discrimination, Congress
enacted the ADA, which developed from § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.42 The
ADA provisions require equal treatment of disabled individuals in the private
sector.4 3

The ADA covers employers, including state and local governments and
agencies, 44 as well as labor organizations, employment agencies, and others
employing fifteen or more individuals. 45 The ADA applies an equal or higher
standard of conduct for employers during the hiring process than that required
under the Rehabilitation Act.46 Therefore, the ADA expands the protection
47
provided in earlier legislation.

3642 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(8).

§ 12101 (b)(1).
3829 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. IV 1992).
3742 U.S.C.
39

MichaelA. Faillace, Title I oftheAmericans with DisabilityAct:Statutory Requirements,
LegislativeHistory,Regulations, TechnicalAssistanceManual,Relevant Cases Under theADA
and 1973 RehabilitationAct and PracticalRecommendations117, in 23RD ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON EMPLOYMENT LAw 965 (1994).
40

OCLETREE, supra note 32, at 2-5.

41

The ADA

specifically

regulates private employers and state and local

governments. The term "employer" is defined by the ADA as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any
agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
42
OGLETREE, supra note 32, at 3-7. See also, Pincus, supra note 18, at 568 n.42 (quoting
from Federal Register).
43

0CLETREE, supra note 32, at xv.
44The United States Government, corporations owned by the federal government,
Indian tribes, and bona fide tax-exempt private membership clubs are not considered
employers under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B).
4542 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12112(5)(A). From July 26,1992, until July 26,1994, the ADA
applied to those employers who employed 25 or more individuals. 42 U.S.C. §
12111(5)(A).
4642 U.S.C. § 12201(a).
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Although the ADA mandates that the disability of a candidate not be a factor
in hiring, an employer does not have to give preferential treatment to those
with a disability.48 The ADA defines disability as: "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having
such an impairment."49 The physical or mental impairment can be a
physiological disorder, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss which
affects one or more of the body systems. 50 It is believed that AIDS and HIV are
examples of disabilities under this legislation.51 Although alcoholics and drug
abusers are also included as individuals with disabilities, they are included
only to the extent that they are not currently using drugs or drinking alcohol
on the job.52 Prior legislation required employers of alcoholics to offer
rehabilitation, often numerous times, but under the ADA, an alcoholic is held
to the same employment standards as other employees. 53 Moreover, physical
characteristics, such as hair or eye color, weight, and height, that are not the
result of a physiological disorder, are not "disabilities" under the ADA.54 This
includes, for example, left-handedness 5 5 and one's sexual preference. 56
Under the ADA regulations, having a disability does not automatically
qualify an individual for protection.57 The disability must limit one of life's
major activities such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, or walking. 58 When determining whether an
impairment falls under the ADA, three factors are to be considered: "the nature
and severity of the impairment; the duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and the permanent or long-term impact, or the expected
permanent or long-term impact, of the impairment or the results of the impair-

47

OGLETREE, supra note 32, at 2-28.

48

Christopher & Rice, supra note 33, at 763.

4942 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
50
0LEtREE, supra note 32, at 3-12. The body systems include: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory and speech organs, cardiovascular,
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine. Id. at 3-12 to 3-13.
51

Christopher & Rice, supra note 33, at 765-66.

52

1d. at 766-67.

53

Faillace, supra note 39, at 119.

54

1d. at 1.

55

Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986).
5642 U.S.C. § 12211(a) specifically excludes homosexuality and bisexuality from the

definition of disability.
57

0GLETREE,supra note 32, at 3-21.

58 Christopher & Rice, supra note 33, at 768-69.
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ment."59 The legislation indicates that temporary illnesses or physical
conditions do not normally fall under the ADA. 60 Notwithstanding, the ADA
protects those who are "regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment
...even if they have no impairment at all."61 The purpose of this provision is
to protect those employees who are believed to have a disability even though
this supposed disability has not been substantiated by tests. 62 Therefore, if the
employer sees an impairment as disabling, whether real or fictitious, and if
having that impairment would limit a major life activity, then the
Rehabilitation Act or ADA applies. 63
The ADA also prohibits the discrimination of individuals from employment
opportunities based on the mere possibility that the employee may become
unqualified in the future.64 Nevertheless, the ADA permits employers to reject
a disabled applicant when that individual poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of other employees.65 Direct threat is actually a defense the employer
may raise to the accusation of discrimination. 66 In determining an employee's
threat to others, the individual's current condition is the only factor to be
considered. 67 The direct threat must constitute a "significant risk to the health
or safety of others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable
accommodation." 68 If a qualified individual poses a direct threat to himself
which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodations, the employer does
not have to hire that applicant. 69 Neither fear nor speculation that the employee
poses a risk to others is enough to disqualify the individual from the job so long
as that individual is otherwise qualified. 70 Yet, if the employer can show that
a disabled individual would present a high probability of harm to others in a
particular position and that there are no reasonable accommodations which
could alleviate that harm, the employer may reject the applicant.71
Not only does the ADAhave a provision thatno one has to be hired who poses
a direct threat to the safety and health of other employees, but the employer
59 OGLETREE, supra note 32, at 3-24.
60

d. at 3-35, 3-36, 3-37.

61Christopher & Rice, supra note 33, at 772.
62

d.

63

Id.

64

0LETREE, supra note 32, at 4-62.

6542 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
66

OGLETREE, supra note 32, at 4-52 n. 1.

67

Christopher & Rice, supra note 33, at 790.
6842 U.S.C. § 12111(3).
69
7

Faillace, supra note 39, at 108.

OChristopher & Rice, supra note 33, at 790.
1d. at 789.

71
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can also impose a provision "that no employee pose a direct threat to the safety
and health of others in the workplace" after being employed. 72 This allows the
employer to terminate the employment of an individual who, even with
reasonable accommodations, poses a direct threat to other employees' or
patrons' health or safety. The process for terminating employment due to a
disability must be based on a threat which is authentically medically
substantiated, not on speculation created by society's or an individual's fears
and stereotypes. 73
The ADA requires employers to use qualified medical or physical standards
when making employment decisions for a particular job so long as those
standards are job-related and consistent with current business practices. 74 The
standards must apply uniformly to all individuals performing the same job.75
The employer must be able to show that the criteria used in determining the
standards were in fact job-related. 76
When an employer is providing for a disabled employee, there are a number
of reasonable accommodations that are available under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act. One example allows for an employee who is qualified for
one position to be transferred to another so long as he is qualified for this new
position and does not pose a health threat to others.77 Another example is that
a restaurant employee, who is infected with a contagious disease, can be
removed from handling food when reasonable accommodations are not
available to eliminate the risk he presents. This employee can be moved to
another vacant spot for which he is qualified. 78 Although a promotion is not
necessary,79 a demotion or lateral move is allowed provided that reasonable
accommodations are not available to permit the employee to remain in the
current position. 80 Therefore, if there are no positions for which the employee
is qualified and there are no reasonable accommodations available to eliminate
the risk the employee presents, the employment of the individual may be
terminated. 8 1 The ADA reassignment provision is not applicable to those
82
employers who do not have reassignment policies implemented.

72

d.

73

d. at 790.

7442 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4).
75
76

0GLETREE, supranote 32, at 4-12.
d. at 4-50 (citing Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981)).

77

OGLETREE, supranote 32, at 4-87 to 4-93.
7842 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
79

Christopher & Rice, supra note 33, at 779.

80

Pincus, supra note 18, at 578.

81

1d. at 590-91.

82

1d. at 578-79.
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Other types of reasonable accommodations include part-time and modified
work schedules. 83 Furthermore, even though a disabled employee does not
have to be given additional paid leave, another type of reasonable
accommodation includes additional unpaid leave days. 84 Finally, in addition
to reasonable accommodations within the work area, the ADA also requires
that non-work areas such as lunchrooms, entrances and restrooms be accessible
to the disabled individual. 85 It is important to note that the accommodations
do not have to be the best solution, but only "sufficient to meet the needs of the
individual with the disability."86
When making accommodations to an individual posing a direct threat, the
risk caused by the individual's disability does not have to be completely
87
eliminated. Rather, the risk must fall below the level of direct threat. If the
accommodation reduces the risk below the significant risk level, the employer
is not to discriminate against the individual. 88 Only when the accommodation
will neither eliminate nor reduce the direct threat below the level of "significant
risk of substantial harm" can the employer exclude the individual from
employment. 89
The placement of a disabled person in a position with reasonable
90
accommodations must not pose an undue hardship on the business. An
91
undue hardship is one which imposes "significant difficulty or expense." If
or
renovations,
extensive
cost,
requires
the accommodation is excessive in
causes disruptions, it does not have to be conducted. 92 Unlike previous
recommendations on undue hardship, 93 the ADA does not require the
94
employer to show that the accommodations would threaten the business.
An employer must be able to prove that undue hardship will in fact occur;
merely asserting the defense is not enough. 95 Four factors are used when
considering undue hardship: "(1) the nature and cost of the accommodation;
(2) [the] specific facility involved; (3) [t]he nature and type of the employer; and
83

Id. at 578.

84

pincus, supra note 18, at 578.

85

1d. at 577.

86

1d. at 579.

87

OGLETREE, supra note 32, at 4-58.

88

Id.

89

1d.

9042 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

9142 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10)(A),(B).
92

OGLETREE, supranote 32, at 7-4.

93

1d.
Id.

94
95

Ld. at 7-7.
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(4) [tjhe type of operation or operations of the employer."9 6 The employer can
show "undue hardship by demonstrating that an accommodation would be
unduly disruptive to its other employees or to the functioning of its business ."97
In addition to requiring reasonable accommodations that do not impose
undue hardship, the legislation prohibits employers from segregating,
classifying, or in any way limiting an employee's opportunities for
advancement based on the disability.9 8 An example of this type of
discrimination includes "creating a separate line of progression for disabled
employees." 99 A disabled employee must have the same tenure and
promotional track while conducting himself in the same manner as other
employees. Moreover, the ADA prohibits employers from using disparate pay
scales for disabled individuals and from providing a "separate work area for
disabled employees," 100 unless that work area is mandated under the
reasonable accommodations requirement.
Historically, employers inquired about an applicant's background when
making hiring decisions.101 This included checking the individual's education,
references, medical history, and former employment. Although the employer
may want to inquire into the medical background of the applicant before
making reasonable accommodations, 102 this is no longer allowed under the
ADA. Employers cannot require a pre-employment physical exam,103 nor can
they require or request information "about the existence, nature, or severity of
any disability" the individual may have through interviews or written
questionnaires. 104 However, the employee may be asked about his ability to
perform specific job-related functions05 and about his qualifications.106 For
example, if lifting heavy boxes is an essential function of the job, an employer
can ask if the individual has any problem lifting or carrying heavy objects.
Once an offer has been made, the employer may require a medical
examination "prior to the commencement of the employment duties.., and
" 10 7
may condition an offer of employment on the results of such examinations.
96

OGLETREE, supra note 32, at 7-8.

97

Christopher & Rice, supra note 33, at 784.

9842 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1).
99

Christopher & Rice, supra note 33, at 785.

100

1d.

101

Id. at 790.

1021d.
10342 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A).
104 Davenport, supra note 34, at 310.

10542 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B).
106 Christopher & Rice, supra note 33, at 791.

10742 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3).
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This action is permissible if all employees are subject to the same
examinations, 108 all the information acquired by the employer from the
examinations is treated as confidential, 1° 9 and the examination is "job-related
and consistent with business necessity"110
Although federal government contractors and subcontractors are allowed
to provide individuals an opportunity to identify themselves as disabled for
affirmative action purposes under the Rehabilitation Act, this practice is
prohibited to most other employers falling under the ADA. 111 The
Rehabilitation Act requires affirmative action from federal government
contractors and subcontractors, whereas the ADA does not have such a
112
requirement for all other employers.
IV.RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIDS AND FEDERAL LAw
A. FederalLegislation and AIDS
AIDS is believed to fall within the definition of a disability under the ADA.
However, no cases have been decided by the United States Supreme Court
under the ADA in which the Court held AIDS to be a disability.li3 Nevertheless,
individuals with AIDS are protected from discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act.114 Notwithstanding this, the Supreme Court has not ruled
that an HIV-infected individual has been discriminated against due to
disparate treatment by an employer.115
The ADA parallels the language used in the Rehabilitation Act and
incorporates the standard required of federal agencies to apply to the private
sector and to local governments. The case history of the Rehabilitation Act can
be used as a guideline for deciding cases under the ADA. Although most
provisions are similarly stated in the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, in some
instances, the ADA is more stringent than the Rehabilitation Act. For example,

10842 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A).
10942 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B). However, managers and supervisors may be informed
of the examination results "regarding necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the
employee and necessary accommodations [and] first aid... personnel maybe informed
...
if the disability might require emergency treatment." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(3)(B)(i),
(ii).
11042 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
11 1

Faillace, supra note 39, at 120.

112

1d. at 121.

113

Pincus, supra note 18, at 572.

14

1 Ch/k v. U.S. Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
115
Although there are numerous state statutes dealing with discrimination against
individuals with AIDS, these statutes will not be evaluated in this paper. Fora discussion
of state AIDS statutes see Turowski, supra note 27, at 139.
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the ADA does not allow employers to discriminate against individuals with

116
contagious diseases.
In order for an AIDS-infected individual to qualify under the Rehabilitation
Act or the ADA, he must satisfy a number of requirements. First, it must be
11 7
determined whether AIDS and/or HIV fall under the definition of disability.
Second, the disability must "substantially limit a major life activity."118
Procreation is considered a major life activity.119 AIDS and HIV limit a major
life activity since those who are infected with HIV and AIDS often cannot
procreate due to the risk of transmission to the partner and fetus, therefore
limiting intimate personal relations. 120
The third requirement is that the reasonable accommodations may not cause
undue hardship on the employer.121 Although AIDS and HIV seem to fall
within the ADA regulations, the burden on the employers, both financially and
for the health and safety of others, can be too great to hire someone with HIV
or AIDS. For example, a restaurant owner would not want to risk having an
HIV-positive employee becoming infected with a contagious disease,
opportunities the spreading of which could not be contained with reasonable
accommodations. 122 The danger of serving unhealthy food is too risky, and the
burden of making appropriate accommodations to protect others from the
123
contagious disease is too great.

Other examples include government positions in which the reasonable
accommodations would be too burdensome on the employer. In Dexler v.
Tisch,124 the court held that the reasonable accommodations necessary to

11642 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12113(d).
117See supra notes 48-71 and accompanying text.
11829 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(j), 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726,35,741 (1991).
119

OGLETREE, supra note 32, at 3-22 to 3-23.

120

1d.

121
122

d. at 7-1.

See, e.g., Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 388 S.E.2d 134,139-40 (N.C. 1990),
in which the North Carolina Supreme Court relied on the North Carolina Handicapped
Persons Act in concluding that the plaintiff, a short order cook, was not protected under
the statute. Id. at 135.
123
The employer may also terminate the employment of an employee who has a
disease on the Secretary of Health's list of contagious diseases so long as reasonable
accommodations cannot be made. 42 US.C. §§ 12113(d)(1),(2). The ADA requires the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to "publish a list of infectious and
communicable diseases which are transmitted through handling the food supply." 42
U.S.C. § 12113(d)(1)(B). An employer can terminate an AIDS-infected employee only if
the disease is on the published list. AIDS may not be expressly on the list, but some of
the opportunistic infections associated with AIDS may be listed. Christopher & Rice,
supra note 33, at 776.
124660 F. Supp. 1418 (D.Conn. 1987).
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employ an individual with achondroplastic dwarfism 125 were not required
since the individual's disability would unduly interfere with the employee's
working potential. 126 A further example is that a foreign service employee
could be restricted to positions where reasonable accommodations can be
made. In American Federation of Government Employees v. United States
Departmentof State,127 the court held that the Rehabilitation Act did not require
accommodations for an HIV-positive employee who was not otherwise
considered qualified for the job in question.128 The court concluded that the
disabled individual could be restricted to positions in locations where adequate
health and medical services would be available, since any additional
"accommodation would require the Department of State fundamentally to alter
its medical fitness program's [policy] ... or to incur an undue financial burden
in upgrading medical care services." 129
B. AIDS in the Courtroom
By far the greatest hurdle to AIDS-infected individuals searching for a job is
the exclusion permitted by the ADA that "an employer may implement the
requirement that no employee pose a direct threat to the safety and health of
others in the workplace.' 130 Nonetheless, employers are concerned about
whether an HIV- or AIDS-infected employee is able to perform within the
131
workforce.
In Doe v. District of Columbia,132 the court held that the District of Columbia
violated the Rehabilitation Act by withdrawing an offer of employment as a
firefighter after finding out that the applicant was HIV-positive. 133 The
physical exam did not include an HIV test, but whoever passed the physical
exam was considered "fully capable physically of performing the duties of a
firefighter without risk to himself or others." 134 The plaintiff was offered a job
as a firefighter, but after he notified the city of his HI-V status, Doe was advised

12SAchondroplastic dwarf is defined as "[a] dwarf, affected with achondroplasis,

having short limbs and a trunk of relatively normal size. The head is often enlarged." 1
SCHMIDT'S ATIORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, supranote 14, at A-51.

126660 F. Supp. at 1425-26.
127662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).
128

1d. at 54.

129

Id. at 54 n.7.

130Christopher & Rice, supra note 33, at 789.
13 1
Pincus, supra note 18, at 562.
132796 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1992).
133

d. at 573.

134

d. at 561.
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not to show up for work. 135 The Fire Department conducted two additional
HIV tests, both of which had positive results, and Doe was never summoned
to start work. 136 The court concluded that the District of Columbia
discriminated against Doe because of his HIV status 137 and therefore violated
138
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
The Doe court heard uncontested testimony that "several fire departments
throughout the United States . . . employ HT-positive firefighters in
active-duty status." 139 These other departments did not require additional
precautions for their HIV-positive firefighters because the use of the personal
protective equipment1 40 and universal precautions141 was "sufficient to protect
against harm to the firefighter or others."142 Testimony indicated that using the
equipment provided to the firemen "eliminates the risk of blood-to-blood
contact in the performance of firefighting functions." 143 Even in the case of
mouth-to-mouth contact, the transmission of HIV presents "no measurable
risk."144 The court therefore concluded that "an HIV-infected person poses no
measurable risk of transmitting the disease through the performance of
145
firefighting duties.'
Recently, many cities and other governmental entities started requiring AIDS
testing. 146 This is often done in addition to other tests as part of the annual
physical exam for those employed in high-risk occupations. The employees are
135

1d. at 565.

136

796 F. Supp. at 565.

13 7

1d. at 570.

13 8

1d. at 571.

13 9

1d. at 564.

14 0

The equipment issued to a firefighter includes: (1) a helmet with a shield which

protects the face from blood splattering from a victim; (2) a hood which is used to
provide additional covering to the neck and head; (3) a "bunker coat" which is a

fire-resistant coat that is non-absorbent; (4) 'bunker pants" made of the same material
as the coat, but with additional protection on the knees, (5) fire-resistant gloves which
because of their thickness, offer protection against cuts or punctures; (6) "bunker boots"

made of rubber with steel toes; (7) a self-contained breathing apparatus which "enables
a firefighter to breath safely when entering a smoke-filled building;" (8) a medical

emergency kit containing gloves and a CPR mask (this provides protection in case of
mouth-to-mouth contact) both of which should be in the bunker coat, along with other
medical equipment such as dressings and other emergency supplies. 796 F. Supp. at
561-62.
141
See infra notes 147-166 and accompanying text.
142796 F. Supp. at 564.
143

1d.

144

Id.

145

1d.

146

See,e.g., Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
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usually policemen and firemen. The results of the test are used to help
determine fitness for duty.
In Anonymous Firemanv. City of Willoughby,147 the City implemented a policy
requiring mandatory testing of all full-time employees for the HIV virus as part
of the annual physical exam. 1 48 The test was required to determine fitness for
duty of all City safety forces.149 The collective bargaining agreement
("Agreement") between the City and the firemen's union stated that
"individuals showing no symptoms of related disease and without significant
immune system dysfunction remain eligible for all employment benefits. No
employee will be separated, and benefits will not be affected by a finding of
HIV infection. 150 The Agreement contained a provision that permitted the
removal of an infected fireman from active duty to a position where there was
no contact with the general public.151 This permitted the City, at its discretion,
to decline to make any changes in an employee's position after the employee
tested positive for the AIDS antibodies, but before the employee was
152
symptomatic with the actual disease.
Since Anonymous Fireman was decided before the ADA went into effect, it
was decided under the Rehabilitation Act. The Agreement appears to satisfy
the Rehabilitation Act's requirements of reasonable accommodations to
disabled employees. 153 In rendering its decision, the court referred to
guidelines established by the Centers for Disease Contro 1 54 that minimize the
transmission of IV in the health care setting.155 The provisions developed by
the CDC are routinely used by health care professionals and have been
implemented by the Willoughby Fire Department. 156 The CDC recommends
that firemen wear gloves, masks, gowns, protective eyewear and use
puncture-resistant containers for the disposal of needles. 157 The Anonymous
Fireman court stated that firemen and paramedics are to use these precautions

14 7

Id.

148

Id. at 408.

149

1d.

150779 F. Supp. at 410.
151Id.
152

1d.

53

1 Under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, the reasonable accommodations
provision can be affected by a collective bargaining agreement. See Christopher & Rice,
supra note 33, at 781.
154

Hereinafter CDC.
155779 F. Supp. at 412. These guidelines were established by the CDC in 1985.
156

1d.

157

d.
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since they are in a high-risk category for contracting or transmitting HIV. 158
Nevertheless, these individuals are also exposed to blood and other bodily
fluids in a "non-controlled setting"15 9 in which the precautions set up by the
CDC would not be practical.160 The CDC precautions are among the only ways
to reduce the risk of transmission whether from the victim or from the city
employee.
An employer can claim that an HlV-positive individual is not "otherwise
qualified" if it can show the existence of a "bona fide occupational
qualification"161 for the position in which there is a direct threat of substantial
harm should the individual be hired or maintained. 162 One example of a "bona
fide occupational qualification" is the hiring of an employee in a medical
institution, since an HIV-positive individual poses a higher risk to patients with
whomhe comes into contact.163 The health care provider has the duty to protect
the patients from AIDS transmission. This duty is enough to satisfy a "bona fide
occupational qualification" and thus permit the employer's removal of any
employee who poses a threat of substantial harm. 164 Thus, HIV-positive health
care professionals may be limited in their degree of contact with patients.
It is clear that mandatory testing does not prevent the transmission of the
AIDS virus, but it is argued that testing could eliminate some of the harm of
transmission. Therefore, those employees working in high-risk or
safety-related occupations could be eliminated from employment positions or
opportunities by a bona fide standard which requires imminent harm to those
needing assistance.
In Anonymous Fireman, the City claimed a legitimate, even compelling,
governmental interest in its firefighters' "fitness for duty."165 Mandatory testing
is one of the factors in determining who is fit for duty and who is not.166 It is
this author's opinion that the claim of mandatory testing determining who is
fit for duty was not substantiated by the Agreement nor by current medical
information.

158/d.
159 The court did not define a "non-controlled setting."
160779 F. Supp. at 412.

161Pincus, supra note 18, at 589.
162/d.
163

d. at 589-90.

164MId. at 590.
165779 F. Supp. at 417.
16 6 The City also wanted to use the results of the test to establish a baseline to use in
determining future worker's compensation claims, thereby determining whether or not
the HIV exposure occurred during the firefighter's employment with the City. Id. at

408-09.
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The Agreement provided the City with four options regarding the fate of the
employment of an HIV-positive individual. The first allowed the City to
determine whether an individual who tested positive for HIV could continue
in his/her current position. 167 The second allowed that individual to be
transferred to "another position in the Fire Department where the employee
[would] not be in contact with the general public." 168 The third enabled the
employer to move "the employee to another position outside the Fire
Department. 169 Finally, the employee could be removed from all duties. 170 It
is not mandatory that all those with positive results be isolated from the public,
rather, the City may choose any of the aforementioned options when faced with
17
an HWV-infected employee. 1
The court in Anonymous Firemanconcluded that those individuals who have
negative test results will have "peace of mind" and can "practice prevention
through the use of universal precautions and other means." 172 Moreover, those
who test positive for HIV can take "extra precautions... to avoid the spread of
AIDS." 173 Therefore, whether or not they test positive for the virus, all
firefighters should use preventive measures to reduce the chance of spreading
any deadly disease. The precautions available to those who test positive for
HIV are no more stringent than those for individuals with negative results.
Since the court held that there was a compelling governmental interest in
"protection of the public from the contraction and transmission of AIDS by
firefighters and paramedics," 174 infected individuals could be removed from
work without violating the Rehabilitation Act.
The court in Anonymous Firemanconsidered medical evidence establishing
that the risk of transmitting HIV in this line of work is high.175 It is well
documented that the transmission of HIV has occurred through blood-to-blood
contact. 176 This is a concern for all firefighters, especially paramedics, who deal
with victims in uncontrolled environments. 177 In order for HIV to be transmit-

16 7

Id.at 410.

168

1d.
169779 F. Supp. at 410.
17OId.
171Id.
172779 F. Supp. at 417.
173

Id.

174

d. at 416.
1d. at 411-12.

175

176 Jaffe, supra note 8, at 17.
177 Dr. Brian McNamee testified to the court that "[flirefighters and paramedics are at
higher risk than persons in hospitals because it is a non-controlled setting, as compared
to an emergency room which is more controlled." 779 F. Supp. at 407.
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ted by blood, there must be a fair amount of blood-to-blood contact. 178 For a
paramedic, contact with blood or other bodily fluids can occur in numerous
ways during an emergency call. 179 The expert medical witness was not aware
of any cases of "transmission by or to any health care worker during the
performance of firefighting duties or while rendering emergency medical
care." 1 0
Nonetheless, the Anonymous Fireman court determined that "[t]he City of
Willoughby has a duty to keep its employees free from the risk of a contagious
disease and to provide a safe workforce. 181 One doctor testified that
"firefighters and paramedics generally are not at high risk to get infected on the
job . . . [and] that the occupational risk for firefighters is low."182 Without
knowledge of any transmission of HIV or AIDS from a fireman or policeman
to a citizen on which to base the City's fear of infection, the City should be
183
required to provide another defense for its policies affecting the employment
of HIV-infected individuals. The employer is required to use only valid medical
information when establishing standards under the Rehabilitation Act. In the
case at hand, this requirement was not demonstrated.
Although transmission of HIV has occurred through blood-to-blood contact,
there are no known cases as of yet, of the transmission of HV to an individual
from a fireman or paramedic through mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. 184 In
addition, there are no known cases of transmission of HIV from saliva alone.
Rather, there is only a theoretical possibility that the virus can spread through
saliva.1 85 The theory that HIV can be spread through salivary transmission
developed because other infectious diseases are transmitted in that manner.
Cities are protected from having to make accommodations for HV-positive
employees by the direct threat defense. 186 A city only has to show that there is
a significant risk to another's health and safety posed by the continued
employment of the infected individual. Hospitals have successfully suspended
178 Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559,563 (D.D.C. 1992).
179779 F. Supp. at 412.
180796 F. Supp. at563 (testimony of Dr. DavidParenti, Associate Professorof Medicine
in the Division of Infectious Disease at George Washington University Medical Center).

181779 F. Supp. at 416.
18 21d. at 406.

183This includes hiring, moving, and terminating the HIV-infected individual.
184 Richard Roe v. District of Columbia, 842 F. Supp. 563, 566, vacated, 25 F.3d 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing CDC publication "Guidelines for Prevention of Transmission of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Health-Care and Public
Safety Workers," 1989).
185

1n Anonymous Fireman, the court stated, "[reports have indicated that AIDS may

be spread through saliva, splashes to the skin, oral sex, and the mucous membrane." 779
F. Supp. at 411 (emphasis added).
186

See supra notes 64-94 and accompanying text.
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an HIV-positive doctor's duties against judicial attack. 187 Hospitals' use of the
"no risk" standard could violate the ADA's requirement of "significant risk."188
The "no risk" standard restricts the infected employee to positions and duties
"that pose no transmission risks."189 Under the ADA, a health care provider
must show that there are no reasonable accommodations which could
eliminate the harm. 1 90

The Supreme Court stated in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline191 that
"a person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease
to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his or her job if
reasonable accommodations will not eliminate that risk."1 92 The Court came
up with a four-step test to determine when reasonable accommodations are
possible. 193 The four-step test as applied to HIV-positive health care employees
requires the health industry to "examine [1] the modes of HIV transmission, [2]
the duration of the risk, [3] the amount of risk to other healthy individuals, and
[4] the likelihood of occupational transmission" when determining reasonable
accommodations. 194
The four factors may be evaluated separately. The first step examines the
modes of transportation which, as discussed above, are threefold for the
transmission of HIV and AIDS to an uninfected individual. 195 Since the disease
never goes away and because it is deadly, the duration of the risk, evaluated in
step two of the Arline test, will exist as long as the individual is employed.
Steps three and four may be looked at together when discussing HIV and
AIDS. When there is only casual contact between the health care provider and
other employees or patients, there is no proven documentation of
transmission.1 96 However, there is some controversy regarding the
transmission of the HIV from a doctor to a patient. In 1990, the CDC issued a
report informing the public about the possibility of the transmission of HIV
from a dentist to numerous patients. 197 Whether the dentist transmitted the
187

1n Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J.Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991), the court upheld the exclusion of an AIDS-infected surgeon from
performing invasive procedures.
188
R. Bradley Prewitt, The "Direct Threat" Approach to the HIV-Positive Health Care
Employee Under the ADA, 62 Miss. LJ. 719, 729 (1993).
189

1d.

19042 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5).
191480 U.S. 273 (1987).
1 92

1d. at 287.

19 3

1d. at 288.

94

1 Prewitt, supra note 188, at 733.
195779 F. Supp. at 403.
196796 F. Supp. at 563.
197 Litchy, supra note 15, at 1.
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disease to all of the patients who tested positive for HIV is still unclear. If the
dentist did in fact infect any of the individuals, it would be the first documented
case of transmission of HW from a health care provider to patient. Indications
are that the likelihood of transmission from provider to patient is slim at best.
V. TESTING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The individual in Anonymous Fireman claimed that his rights under the
Fourth, 198 Ninth, 199 and Fourteenth 200 Amendments were violated by the
mandatory tests for HIV that were conducted on blood already extracted
during his annual physical exam.201 When determining whether there has been
a violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights during mandatory
testing, courts may compare HIX testing to drug testing. The City contended
that the fireman's constitutional rights were waived by the Agreement. 202
Although the court held that a "labor organization cannot waive an
individual's constitutional rights,"203 it found, in the words of the Supreme
Court commenting on blood tests, that "such tests are commonplace in these
days ... and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk,
trauma, or pain,"204 and reasoned that the intrusion upon the firefighter's
rights was not significant enough to outweigh the City's interest in having
205
physically fit employees.

19 8

The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
199

The Ninth Amendment states "It]heenumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. IX
20 0

The pertinent part of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S.CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
201779 F. Supp. at 402.

2021d.
203 Id.
at 415.
204

1d. (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).

205779 F. Supp. at 416-17.
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In the past, a permissible search could be conducted without a search
warrant only upon probable cause that a crime had been committed.206 The
Supreme Court now relies on a "reasonableness" test rather than the probable
cause standard. 207 The government's interest in conducting the search must be
reasonably weighed against an individual's right to be left alone. 208 Therefore,
the permissible search consideration requires a case-by-case approach,
balancing the individual's privacy expectations against the "government's
209
need for supervision, control, and efficient operation of the workplace."
Since the Supreme Court has held that the removal of blood constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment,210 the Anonymous Firemancourt weighed
the competing interests of the City against those of the individual to determine
if the search was reasonable. The court in Anonymous Fireman found that the
City of Willoughby's testing policy was not an unreasonable search and
seizure. 211 The court followed the precedent of Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n.212 and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab213 in
reaching this decision. In both of these cases, the Supreme Court developed a
"special need" provision to be applied when the government's interest is in the
"safety-sensitive'2 14 industries. 2 15 The Anonymous Firemancourt concluded by
stating:
206

Kenneth C. Haas, The Supreme Court Enters the "Jar Wars": Drug Testing, Public

Employees, and the FourthAmendment, 94 DIcK. L. REv. 305, 312 (1990).
207

1d. at 314.

208

Id.

209

1d. at 315 (citing O'Connor v. Orega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-20 (1987)).

0

21 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,767-68 (1966).
211779 F. Supp. at 418.
212

The railway labor organization filed suit against the Secretary of Transportation
to enjoin implementation of a regulation governing the testing for drugs and alcohol in
railroad employees. The Supreme Court held that, although the Fourth Amendment
was applicable to the mandatory testing under the Federal Railroad Administration
regulations, those tests were reasonable regardless of suspicion or warrant. 489 U.S. 602
(1989).
213
The National Treasury Employees Union brought an action to challenge the
constitutionality of the United States Customs Service's drug-testing program. The
testing required analyses of those individuals who were to be promoted to positions
involving interdiction of illegal drugs, requiring the carrying of a firearm, or requiring
handling of classified material. The Supreme Court again held that the test met the
requirement of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment regardless of suspicion
due to the sensitive nature of the work. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
214 Although there is no definition of "safety-sensitive" occupations or industries, the
case holdings indicate that "police officers, correctional officers, firefighters, train
operators, bus drivers, airline pilots, [and] nuclear power plant workers" fall under this
provision. Haas, supra note 206, at 321.
2 15
1d.
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This case does not stand for the general proposition of mandatory
testing of all employees for AIDS ....This is a very limited decision
and only stands for the proposition that mandatory testing may be
ordered for high-risk government employees such as firefighters and
is one who has a high
paramedics. A high-risk government employee2 16
risk of contracting AIDS or transmitting AIDS.
The holdings of Von Raab and Skinner suggest that certain employees can be
tested for drugs simply because of the positions they hold or the very nature
of their jobs. 2 17 These case holdings can be construed to "permit unannounced
periodic blood and urine testing of incumbent police officers. . ., correctional
officer[s], firefighters, .. . and other employees in positions that are irrefutably
safety-sensitive." 2 18 Although the court found no violation of the plaintiff's
constitutional rights in Anonymous Fireman,there remains the question whether
compliance with the ADA could violate one's Fourth Amendment rights.
Since the ADA allows employers to conduct physical exams after a job offer
is given, 219 the employee may be required to give a blood and/or urine sample.
If the job falls under the safety-sensitive classification, this will not violate the
Fourth Amendment. Moreover, once the individual is offered the job, but before
commencing work, the applicant may be required to submit to a mandatory
physical or mental test as a condition of employment. 220 Pre-employment drug
testing is permissible when done in connection with the physical exam and the
position for which the individual is applying is "safety-sensitive." 221 However,
there is a difference between testing for drug or alcohol abuse and testing for
HIV.
Unlike an employee who uses illegal drugs while working, the HIV-infected
employee has neither committed a crime nor been suspected of using illegal
substances at the time of the test. This separates an T-ffV blood test from a urine
analysis that is used for determining substance abuse. Testing for HIV does not
reveal any past illegal activity which may be in conflict with the individual's
job. The arguments used for legalizing drug testing would not work for AIDS
testing. For example, an HIV-positive train operator does not pose the same
degree of threat as a train operator who is intoxicated. Therefore, the
reasonableness test used in Skinner should not be applicable.

216779 F. Supp. at 418.
217

Haas, supra note 206, at 352.
1 1d. at 360.
21942 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A).
2 8

22042 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3).
221

Haas, supra note 206, at 324.
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In Skinner, there were continuing problems of on-the-job intoxication. 222 In
addition, the railroad industry experienced twenty-one major train accidents
between 1972 and 1983 involving alcohol or drug use, causing twenty-five
fatalities and numerous other injuries.223 The Court stated that the government
had a duty to insure safety since the employees were "engaged in
safety-sensitive tasks."224 The Federal Railroad Administration showed a
connection between the conduct in question and the need to monitor illegal
drug use by demonstrating that numerous deaths occurred due to the use of
drugs or alcohol by employees while working. However, in HIV- and
AIDS-related cases, local governments have not proven a connection between
their need to insure safety (against the transmission of HV or AIDS) and the
HIV test requirement to determine the physical fitness of their employees.
The Anonymous Fireman court concluded that the firefighters' concerns
regarding HV infections were not enough to raise "constitutional privacy
issues;" 22 5 rather, the testing itself is enough to implicate the Fourth
Amendment.226 The court stated that the government had an interest and a
duty to "provide a safe workforce." 227 The government did not have to show
actual harm from lack of knowledge regarding HIV-positive employees.
Currently, there is only one case of possible transmission from a health care
provider to a patient. This is not enough to warrant the government's intrusion
upon the employee's Fourth Amendment rights without analyzing the
individual's right to privacy.
VI. LIABILITY FOR STATES AS EMPLOYERS

A. CriminalLiability
Who should be held responsible when a city employee, who tested positive
for HIV in his annual exam, transmits the disease to an an individual needing
assistance during the course of employment? The city could be held liable since
it knowingly allowed an individual, who could be a threat to another, to work
in a high-risk area such as firefighting.
There are cases that have held that one who has knowingly and intentionally
tried to transmit the HIV virus is criminally responsible. In State of New Jersey
v. Smith,228 the court affirmed the conviction of the defendant who was found

222489 U.S. at 607.
22 3

/d.

224M. at 620.

225779 F. Supp. at 416.
226

1d.

22 7

1d.

228621 A.2d 493 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
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guilty of attempted murder after biting the victim. 229 The defendant believed
that he could cause death by biting.230 Since the defendant knew that he was
HIV-positive and made numerous threats to kill a correctional officer by biting
him, the court concluded that the defendant had the intent to kill the officer
regardless of the unlikelihood of HIV transmission through biting.231 Similarly,
in Weeks v. State of Texas, 232 since the defendant thought he could transmit HIV
by spitting twice at the guard's face, the defendant was found guilty of
attempted murder.233
As previously stated, the attempt to transmit HIV intentionally has been
considered to be attempted murder 23 4 by some courts.235 In Weeks, the act of
attempted transmission occurred during the commission of a crime.236 It seems
possible that an individual could be held criminally responsible for the
transmission of HIV even without committing another criminal act. Current
case law does not clear up the question of whether it is a crime to transmit HIV

intentionally without committing another criminal act. Simply the knowledge
that one is HIV-positive and that transmission could theoretically occur by
certain conduct may be enough to satisfy the required elements (at least in some
237
states) for attempted murder.

If there has been no proof of transmission through a set of particular acts,
but research indicates that there may be a possibility that transmission of HIV
229M.at 516.
230

1d. at 496.

23 1

Id.

232834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
233
The defendant argued that the State had to "prove either that there was any virus
present in [defendant's] saliva or that the possibility of transmission was reasonably
likely." Id. at 560. The record in the case indicates that the defendant believed that he
could kill his victims by spitting on them. The trial presented different viewpoints on
whetherHIV could be transmitted through saliva. The jury was then instructed that "[a]
person commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act
amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails, to effect the commission
of the offense intended. Such is an attempt to commit an offense." Id. at 565. The jury
was properly given the elements of attempted murder and found the defendant guilty.
Id. When looking at the facts of the case, it is unclear why the discussion of whether HIV
could be transmitted by biting was used. The elements of the crime do not require that
the "act amounting to more than mere preparation" ever be successful. The fact that the
defendant believed that transmission could occur and death would be a result satisfies
the elements of the crime. 834 S.W.2d at 559.
234
For an attempted crime the individual must have "[a n intent to commit a crime
coupled with an act taken toward committing the offense." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
127 (6th ed. 1991).
235
See, e.g., Weeks, 834 S.W.2d 559; Smith, 621 A.2d 493.

236834 S.W.2d at 561. The plaintiff verbally attacked the officers and vandalized the
state's van. Id.
237See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720 para. 5/8-4 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
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or AIDS could occur, is the individual guilty of attempted murder simply by
having the disease and performing the act in question? For example, there are
no known cases of transmission of HIV from a firefighter to another
individual.2m If the firefighter is HIV-positive and performs his on-the-job duty
to rescue another person in a way in which there is a possibility of transmission,
is he guilty of attempted murder?
In the employment setting, it can be argued that there is an intent by the
employer to infect others simply by knowingly placing the infected individual
in a high-risk occupation. In addition, it can be argued that when there is an
intent to infect another individual with HIV, there is intent to kill. If proper
precautions are used, the argument of intent to infect another should be
eliminated, thereby protecting cities from criminal prosecution.
It is unclear how far courts will go in construing criminal law regarding
possible HIV transmissions. If the courts hold the individual responsible for
the possibility of knowingly transmitting the disease, then it is in the
individual's best interest not to be hired for specific high-risk positions. The
ADA should not require cities to employ HV-positive individuals in high-risk
occupations when exposure to the public in those positions could lead to
attempted murder charges.
B. Civil Liability
In addition to criminal charges, an HIV-infected individual may also have
civil charges brought against him or his employer. These charges may be based
on negligence, strict liability, or vicarious liability.
1. Negligence
There could be a claim of negligence against an employer after the
transmission of HIV to a victim cared for by a city employee. 239 Negligence is
defined as "conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of causing
damage."240 The four elements for a cause of action in negligence are: (1) "[a]
duty, or obligation" in which the law requires a standard of conduct "for the
protection of others against unreasonable risks;" (2) a breach of the duty to
conform to the standard; (3) "a reasonably close causal connection between the
conduct and the resulting injury;" and (4) an "[aictual loss or damage resulting"
24
to the injured party. 1
The case law currently available indicates that a city has a duty of care to its
residents. 242 Therefore, the first prong of the negligence test is met. If the city
238See Doe, 796 F. Supp. 559.
239

Pincus, supra note 18, at 589-90.

240W. PAGE KEETON ETAL., PROSSER AND KEETON ONTHE LAW OF TORTIS, § 31 at 169 (5th
ed. 1984) (citations omitted).
241

1d. § 31 at 164-65.

242See Anonymous Fireman,779 F. Supp. 402.
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can employ individuals with HIV,243 did the city breach its duty of care by
employing those individuals infected with the deadly disease in positions of
high risk? It can be argued that there was a breach of the city's standard of
conduct by placing employees in positions where transmission was possible.
The second element is harder to examine. This element requires the
employer, in this case the city, to fail to conform to the standard. What this
standard should be is unclear. The standard of care could range from reducing
the likelihood of transmission, through the use of precautions, to the
elimination of employees who cause the possible harm. If the standard is
termination of infected employees, there again may be a conflict with the ADA
regulations requiring the employment of individuals with disabilities.
Since the Supreme Court has not determined whether AIDS is a disability
under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA, it is difficult to determine if the city
conformed to the required standard. If AIDS is not a disability, then there is a
greater chance that the city would be held to a higher standard of care. The city
would need to eliminate as much of the risk as possible. That would mean
requiring those with H1V or AIDS to work away from the public in low-risk
areas.
On the other hand, if HIV and AIDS are disabilities under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act, then the employer may not discriminate against the
individual without a defense such as undue hardship or direct threat to the
health and safety of others.244 This may place the employer in the precarious
position of hiring an HIV-infected employee who does not pose a direct threat
under the ADA, but allows a cause of action for negligence based upon his
employment if he transmits the HIV virus to another during the course of
employment. If the standard of care corresponds with the literature on the
proper precautions for firefighters, the employees could eliminate the liability
of the city by following the prescribed universal protection precautions. 245
Without a standard of care that corresponds with the federal legislation, cities
may be held liable for the transmission of a deadly disease from employee to
another, regardless of the care used in limiting the likelihood of transmission.
As Prosser stated,
[t]he odds may be a thousand to one that no train will arrive at the very
moment that an automobile is crossing a railway track, but the risk of
death is nevertheless sufficiently serious to require the driver to look
for the train and the train to signal its approach.... As the gravity of
the possible harm increases, the apparent likelihood of its occurrence
need be correspondingly less to generate a duty of precaution. 24

2 43

See Doe, 796 F. Supp. 559.
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See supra notes 83-105 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 147-166 and accompanying text.
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KEETON, supranote 240, § 31 at 171.
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The third negligence requirement is proving the causal connection between
the conduct and the harm caused. Once it is shown that a city's conduct was a
cause of the injury, one must determine whether the city's conduct was
significant enough to hold it liable.247 Often the victim must prove that there
was a duty which included the protection against this particular
circumstance. 248
If the city hires those who are RIV-positive, places them in high-risk areas,
and then transmission of HIV occurs, the victim will be able to show that this
requirement is met. The plaintiff could satisfy this requirement simply by
arguing that the employment of the individual by the city resulted in the
contact between the city employee and the victim, and that the contact lead to
the transmission of the virus. This prong can be met with ease by anyone
infected by a city employee.
The fourth element is also easy to satisfy. The injury is the infection itself.
The actual loss would be hard to contest since death is 100% certain once
transmission of the disease occurs. Once all four elements are met, the plaintiff
would have a cause of action for negligence against the government.
2. Vicarious Liability
There could also be a cause of action in vicarious liability249 against the city
because of the city's relationship with the employee. Vicarious liability imputes
negligence on the employer because of a negligent act of the employee. 250 The
paramedic, as an employee, is working as an agent of the employer, the city.
This relationship may open the city to liability for the negligent acts performed
by the employee during the course of business. Ordinarily, the relationship
does not include agents who are not servants, but there are situations in which
liability does occur.251 Therefore, if the employee is HIV-positive and transmits
the disease to another during his employment because he failed to follow the
guidelines set up by the city, the city can be responsible through vicarious
liability. The city may not be able to limit its vicarious liability simply by
implementing guidelines on procedures to be followed.

2471d. § 42 at 273.
248

Id.

249

Black's Law Dictionary defines vicarious liability as "[t]he imposition of liability
on one person for the actionable conduct of another, based solely on a relationship
between the two persons. Indirect or imputed legal responsibility for acts of another;
for example, the liability of an employer for the acts of an employee." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY supra note 234, at 1084.
250

KEEMN, supra note 240, § 69 at 499.

251

1d. § 70 at 508.
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3. Strict Liability
There is also a cause of action for strict liability.25 2 Strict liability is based on
the "defendant's intentional behavior in exposing those in his vicinity to such
a risk."25 Normally, the conduct does not depart from social standards so far
as to be negligent "usually because the advantages which it offers to the
" 254
defendant and to the community outweigh even abnormal risk.
Nevertheless, the conduct is "still so far socially unreasonable that the
defendant is not allowed to carry it on without making good any actual harm
which it does."255 Therefore, the employer is held liable for damages since it is
responsible, not because of fault, but because of its relationship to the
employee.
4. Infliction of Mental Distress
There is also the tort of infliction of mental distress. Many people who have
contracted HIV or AIDS have tried to sue their doctors, blood carriers, hospitals
25 6
In Kerins v. Hartley,25 7
and even significant others under this cause of action.
the plaintiff brought an action for emotional distress against her surgeon and
the surgeon's partners. 2 8 The court relied on the recent holding of Potter v.
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company,259 which allowed for damages based on
emotional distress if the plaintiff could prove: (1) that the defendant breached
a duty of care, and the plaintiff was therefore exposed to a deadly disease, and
(2) that the plaintiff's fear was a result of the knowledge corroborated by

252

Strict liability is defined as "[1]iability without fault." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 234, at 991.
253
KEETON, supra note 240, § 75 at 537.
2 54

1d.

2 55

1d.

2 56

1n Tischler v. Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994), the plaintiff sued
her boyfriend's estate for his infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff alleged that
the deceased boyfriend had never told her of his HIV-positive status. The parties were
sexually active for a period of nine years and only used a condom on occasion. The
defendant moved for summary judgment, which was denied since the plaintiff made a
showing of a prima fade claim of emotional distress. UnderNew York law, theplaintiff
must prove that the decedent owed the plaintiff a "duty ...not to intentionally or
negligently inflict mental distress" since the plaintiff showed probable exposure. Id. at
1009.
25727 Cal.App.4th 1062 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
258

1d. at 1066. The trial court held that the fear of AIDS infection was "unreasonable
as a matter of law given the miniscule risk of HIV transmission with actual percutaneous
exposure during surgery (0.3 percent)," the plaintiff's negative test result for HIV, and
the lack of evidence that exposure did occur. Id. at 1071.
259863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993). The plaintiffs claimed they were exposed to toxic
chemicals while living adjacent to a landfill the defendants used to dump toxic waste.
Id. at 801.
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medical evidence that the plaintiff was likely damaged. 260 In Potter, the
California Supreme Court adopted a "more likely than not" standard when
reviewing emotional distress cases based on medical practices. 261 The Kerins
court applied this "more likely than not" standard when it considered whether
there was a cause of action for emotional distress without proof of physical
damages 262 and concluded that the plaintiff could not collect damages for
emotional distress based on the fear of contracting AIDS. 263 The court stated
that Ms. Kerins had to prove that the defendant's duty of care included
protecting her emotional condition. 264 If Kerins is followed in other
jurisdictions, plaintiffs will not have a cause of action for emotional distress
unless the defendant "acted with oppression, fraud, or malice.'2 65 The plaintiff
must prove that the fear of developing the disease is both reasonable and
genuine and that the fear stems from reliable medical knowledge. 266 In
addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate an actual risk of developing the
disease based on the defendant's breach of duty.267
In some jurisdictions, courts are allowing emotional distress damages. 268 In
these jurisdictions, the court allows the plaintiff to recover for "emotional
distress damages due to the fear of developing AIDS for the reasonable window
of anxiety-the period between which [sic] the plaintiff learns of the health care
worker's or surgeon's HIV seropositivity, and receives fear-relieving
information, such as proof of non-exposure, or HIV-negative test results." 269
Since it is unclear whether the fear of developing or even being exposed to
AIDS can constitute infliction of mental distress, a city will have to closely
scrutinize the laws of the individual state in which it is located. The city could
be opening itself to civil damages should an AIDS-infected individual work in
one of the high-risk areas. The plaintiff may not need to demonstrate actual
exposure to the disease, but rather only that there was a period of time during
which the plaintiff was fearful of developing the disease. This reasoning leaves
room for a case-by-case analysis of what is a reasonable time period between
learning of the infected employee's condition and the plaintiff's negative test
results.
260863 P.2d at 816.
261Id.

26227 Cal.App.4th at 1074.
263

1d. at 1078.
Id. at 1072.

264
265

1d. at 1075.

26627 Cal.App.4th at 1075.
267
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See Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal.App.4th 713, rehggranted,28 Cal.Rptr.2d 151 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993).
26927 Cal.App.4th at 1067.
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VII. CONCLUSION

Local governments find themselves in a tight position. They are stuck
between new federal legislation and current state tort law. Often these laws
conflict. It is unclear whether the state remedies will punish employers who
try to follow the federal statutes.
The federal legislation requires that disabled employees not pose a direct
threat to others. However, plaintiffs could argue that an infected employee does
pose a direct threat because of the fear of transmitting the deadly disease. In
some jurisdictions, the plaintiff may be able to recover damages without
demonstrating actual exposure to HIV.
The problem with the federal legislation is the lack of clear definitions of key
and often problematic words. Some phrases are defined under the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act, but even the definitions are not precise. There is no clear
cutoff point for reasonableness when requiring reasonable accommodations.
In addition, what would be considered "undue hardship"? Under the
Rehabilitation Act, it meant financially burdensome. Under the ADA, there is
no clear delineation as to how far an accommodation has to go before the
employer can terminate an individual.
With the case law currently available, it is easy to see why individuals are
fearful of AIDS. The courts cannot even determine the likelihood of
transmission during employment as a firefighter. Moreover, medical
knowledge indicated that there was little possibility that HIV or AIDS could
be transmitted during the firefighters' duty. Finally, since the dentist in Florida
was revealed to be HIV-positive and there are indications that his patients
contracted the disease from him, there is a stronger argument that employees
in high-risk occupations should be free of deadly infectious diseases.
The current state tort law may require local governments to be liable for their
employment practices, as a result of hiring those individuals who are
HIV-positive. If a governmental entity does not hire disabled individuals, it
will violate the federal legislation. Until the Supreme Court rules on whether
AIDS falls under the ADA's and the Rehabilitation Act's definitions of
"disability" and until medical technology can determine whether or not the
dentist infected his patients (either with or without following the CDC's
guidelines), courts should be leery of rendering decisions against the state for
its hiring and employment practices.
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